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ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to examine the relationship between
stock market performance and country level governance indica-
tors. A good quality of governance in a country ensures effective
implementation of laws which can protect the investor and
improve stock market performance and vice versa. Our study uti-
lises annual stock returns and country level governance indicators
for 25 developed countries from 1996 to 2018. The fixed effect
estimation suggests that stock market performance and govern-
ance indicators share a positive relationship. Our findings suggest
that high quality of governance is associated with higher returns
on stock. Institutional quality is a preconditioned for financial
developed that set the direction of change to reduce transaction
costs and agency costs and make profitable projects available to
firms that subsequently leads to higher demand for equity financ-
ing. These findings have significant implications for stock market
policymakers and standard asset pricing models that only include
market risk factors to predict future expected stock returns.
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1. Introduction
The factors that determine the development of financial systems are of prime import-
ance to answer the question on how some countries manage to acquire necessary
resources for providing financial funding and support for companies, where others
cannot. How do some countries develop laws related to investor protection, their
enforceability and contract enforcement mechanisms which eventually support the
operational capability of financial markets while some other countries fail to
strengthen such laws? If policymakers discover the underlying factors that play a
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deterministic role in differentiating financial development across countries, perhaps
they can provide better and potential advise to up lift those factors?
There has been number of studies to determine the factors of well-functioning
stock markets. Much, but certainly not all, research discusses the inextricable role of
legal system, governance quality and stock market performance across countries. La
Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) examine legal theories which have different
enforceability across countries and their relationships with stock market performance.
The inability of the legal system that cannot enforce shareholder’s contractual rights
often results into managerial expropriation and stealing profits from shareholders.
Moreover, legal systems investor protection mechanisms tend to increase the amount
of funds that risk-averse investors are willing to channel towards firms. Levine (2001)
highlights the importance of law and finance theory in the development of financial
systems of the respective countries. Aggarwal et al. (2002) find that fund managers
invest less in countries with poor legal environments and low corporate govern-
ance standards.
As stated by Hooper et al. (2009) better governance quality reduces transaction
and agency cost by achieving economics of scale, thus, higher governance quality
increasing the stock returns for shareholder. However, Low et al. (2011) find coun-
tries with poor governance quality in terms of political instability, weak investor pro-
tection laws, inefficient government, bad regulatory quality (R.Q.) and less control
over corruption leads to higher stock returns as compare to those countries that have
greater governance quality. Moreover, better governance quality has two competing
hypothesis. The first hypothesis states that better governance quality increases stock
returns by reducing transaction costs and agency costs and second hypothesis estab-
lishes that better investor protection environment will require equity premium in
competitive financial markets internationally (Hooper et al., 2009). This will reduce
the stock returns.
Based on these two competing hypothesis, our research study estimates the rela-
tionship between country-specific governance quality and its impact on stock markets
returns in developed countries. To estimate the governance quality, we consider
World Governance Indicators as a proxy to measure governance and institutional
environment under which corporate governance laws are applicable. Quality of laws,
rules and regulations regarding governance indicators like voice and accountability
(V.A.), political stability (P.S.), absence of violence, G.E., control of corruption (C.C.)
and their implementation is guaranteed by several stake holders like market regula-
tors, courts, market participants and several other government departments. The cross
comparison studies show numerous channels through which effective firm level cor-
porate governance is exercised. Since the relevance of firm level corporate governance
is well established in the literature, however, it is necessary to study the country level
governance quality that formulates the investor protection laws. These legal regula-
tions will strengthen the corporate governance laws based on enforceability. The firms
and their corporate governance laws do not operate in a vacuum so the overall gov-
ernance quality of country affects them.
Hence, there is also an important link between country level governance indicators
and firm level governance indicators which indirectly affects stock market’s performance.
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So far, financial literature has mostly emphasised on firm level governance indicator,
however, the effective and successful implementation of firm level governance indicators
is strongly attached to the successful implementation of country level governance indica-
tors because no firm can operates in isolation rather it operates in a country which is
governed by certain laws and its governance indicators have the ability to affect the per-
formance of firm directly which will eventually hurt the stock market performance. This
study intends to evaluate the extent to which governance quality affect stock market
performance.
Therefore, the aim of this article is to examine cross-sectionally that to what extent
country level governance quality affects, whether positively or negatively, 25 devel-
oped stock market performance. As per the researcher’s knowledge, two comprehen-
sive cross-sectional studies have been carried out to study such a relationship. Both
studies have contradictory results. Moreover, the first study of Hooper et al. (2009)
considers excess stock returns as a dependent variable, while, second study Low et al.
(2014) considers equity market risk, measured as betas, as dependent variables.
Moreover, Low et al. (2011) find World Governance Indicators are insignificant for
stock market performance in developed countries.
Matadeen (2017) conducted empirical research and argued that the determinants
of stock market development include: macroeconomic determinants (real income,
saving rate, financial development, inflation, interest rate and stock market liquidity)
and institutional determinants (corruption, political rights, public sector efficiency,
and regulatory burdens, legal protection of private property and law enforcement, but
also the limits on political leaders). Keita et al. (2019) conducted a complex empirical
study on 89 emerging and developing economies, in order to investigate the linkage
between the quality of fiscal governance and access to market-based external finance.
The authors concluded that transparency of public finances, fiscal reporting, debt
management and fiscal strategy are essential in improving credit ratings, issuing
bonds, and obtaining lower cost of external financing. A durable fiscal governance
has a significant contribution in increasing the capacity of a country to access inter-
national capital markets, impact its credit rating, and influence the terms and cost of
its external debt. Coulibaly et al. (2019) argued that poor governance and fiscal indis-
cipline contributed to the debt overhang and that, unless there are genuine systemic
reforms, history will repeat itself.
The research questions for this study are as follows: Is there a linkage between
stock market performance and country level governance indicators? If yes, how can it
be measured? What is the impact of country level governance indicators on stock
market performance in the case of the sample of developed countries? Was the effect
was positive or negative? Which is the most efficient regression model? Can govern-
ance quality that strengthen investor protection laws play an important role in
affecting the performance of the stock market of any country? Which aspect of gov-
ernance should be emphasised if governance is affecting a country’s stock market
performance?
Our research study contributes to the existing literature by confirming the positive
relationship between governance quality of a county and returns to shareholders in
developed countries. It is argued that the institutional agents that govern a country
3408 Z. A. IMRAN ET AL.
have a direct impact on the profitability of firms by reducing agency cost associated
to business managers, shareholders, the regulation and enforcement of corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: Section 2 critically reviews
the previous studies and establishes the relationship between governance quality and
stock market performance, Section 3 discusses data used in this article and the meth-
odology used to estimate the regression analysis, Section 4 sheds light on empirical
findings and Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
The relationship between governance quality at country level and stock market per-
formance is well documented in finance literature. In this precept, La Porta et al.
(1997) suggested that firms’ dependency on equity financing increases significantly
when improvements are made in rules of corporate governance, their implementation
and the quality of accounting standards. Several aspects of judiciary put a limit on
the funds of corporate resources that mangers can divert, which in turn enable the
shareholders to monitor a manager’s performance at a significantly lower cost.
Governance and its relationship with firms has been the focus of research for a long
time. Early literature in this regard has focused on firm level variables, i.e., agency
cost and firm’s control structure, etc. Jensen and Meckling (1976) wrote an excep-
tional piece of research in this context. They argued that governance mechanisms
vary greatly in terms of their definition which weaken their enforceability as a result
they hurt the level of investor protection since governance mechanisms are flawed at
the fundamental level with weak enforceability and this issue can only be addressed
by the firms themselves. Therefore, the enforceability of a contract’s clauses becomes
the first ever branch of research in the literature of agency cost. However, modern lit-
erature on finance has shifted the focus of research from corporate level governance
indicators to country level governance indicators (see e.g., La Porta et al., 1997, 1998,
2000; Ball et al., 2000; Gul and Qui, 2002; Shleifer and Wolfenson, 2002). It was sug-
gested that, eventually only through legal action, clauses of contracts can be enforced
between managers and shareholders. Therefore, the judicial system’s efficiency of a
country is used as a proxy to monitor the enforcement of contracts. Pajuste (2002)
investigated the impact of corporate governance on stock market performance for the
following countries in Central and Eastern Europe; the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The author con-
cluded that the effectiveness of financial regulations exhibits the highest explanatory
force of stock market returns in the selected countries.
Zaremba (2019) investigated a cross-section of country equity returns based on an
exhaustive literature survey which includes empirical studies for the last 30 years. The
author suggested that the empirical results indicate a large number of cross-sectional
patterns in country equity indices. Moreover, value, momentum, or seasonality
resemble their stock-level counterparts, while others, like fund flows or political risk,
represent a specific feature for country level return patterns. In addition, Bhagat and
Bolton (2008) suggested that stock market-based performance measures are
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vulnerable to investor anticipation due to inter-relationships among corporate gov-
ernance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership
structure. Khan (2019) argued that non-financial performance measures based on
environmental, social and governance (E.S.G.) factors represent significant indicators
that have big potential to influence corporate financial performance.
Connection between the investor protections and the returns to the shareholders is
also extremely weak. Hail and Leuz (2003) examined equity’s cost of firms from 40
countries in terms of their international differences. Their analysis was based on dif-
ferences in country’s legal institutions in general and its securities regulation in par-
ticular and the systematic link of both to the international cost of capital differences.
After controlling for risk and country factors, they reported this finding that firms
operating in a country with strong legal institutions experienced lower costs of equity
on average as compared to the firms operating in countries with weak legal system.
They also found that countries with strong securities regulation with extensive dis-
closure rules and robust legal enforcement would offer firms a systematic lower cost
of capital. They argue that full disclosure to investors and implementation of financial
contracts by judicial system of the country improve the investor protection signifi-
cantly. Hail and Leuz (2003) also inspected how much legal institutions and securities
regulations differ due to integration of markets and economic development. Due to
increased integration of financial markets around the world, in asset pricing, country-
specific variables get weaker as suggested by empirical evidence (e.g., Bekaert &
Harvey, 1995; Stulz, 1999). The authors found that for the financial markets which
are most integrated, the effects of institutions and securities regulation were either
minimal or negligible or insignificant whereas financial markets which are least inte-
grated had strongest legal institution and securities regulation affects which inferred
that market integration and lower cost of capital are related to each other.
Asongu (2011a) investigated the impact of government policies and institutions on
African stock market performance and concluded that countries with better devel-
oped government institutions would favour stock markets with higher market capital-
isation, better turnover ratios, higher value in shares traded and greater number of
listed companies. Moreover, Asongu and Nwachukwu (2018) examined the effect of
political institutions on stock market performance in 14 African countries for the
sample period 1990–2010 and revealed that countries with democratic regimes enjoy
higher levels of financial market development compared to their counterparts with
autocratic inclinations.
Himmelberg et al. (2004) investigated the fact that financial markets do not pro-
vide any investor protection so the consequence will be to enable company insiders
to retain a bigger chunk of equity of the firm they manage. These retaining of a big-
ger chunk of equity by the insiders leads to the increased risk premium and marginal
capital cost due to significant presence of idiosyncratic risk. They found a negative
relationship between extent of investor protection laws and portion of equity held by
the insiders and a positive correlation between insider’s equity and marginal return to
capital. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) investigated the relationship between cost of
equity and insider trading regulations and found that the presence of anti-insider
trading laws does not stop insider trading from happening, however, their
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implementation in true letter and spirit lowers the expected return (risk adjusted) on
equity. They found that implementation of insider trading laws reduces the equity
cost by 5% after controlling several deterministic variables related to cost of equity.
Lombardo and Pagano (2006) examined the correlation coefficient between the level
of institutions’ qualities and performance of stock markets from developed and
emerging capital markets. They took equity returns from stock markets indices as a
proxy to stock market performance. They adopted several different measures to calcu-
late return on equity, including initial public offerings. They found a positive correl-
ation between institutional quality and equity risk adjusted returns. The variables
they used were judicial system, respect of the law, government employees, absence of
corruption, value of accounting rules and risk of contract denial. Lombardo (2000)
quantified institutional infrastructure’s importance and estimated its impact on stock
market performance as equity return. The author inspected the outcomes of fairness
of the law and its impartiality and the degree to which it makes sure that contract is
implemented in its true letter and spirit. The author also examined several measures
of ex post interference. They found that risk-based models C.A.P.M. may not hold
true in several unique situations. Johnson and Shleifer (1999) recommended that pol-
icy designers from transition economies have to create a fair play situation for invest-
ors so that potential investors can concentrate on exploiting growth opportunities
and move beyond the worry of property rights, only then can such economies can
bear the fruits of reforms which are market-oriented.
La Porta et al. (1997) argued that by bringing consistent betterment in the cor-
porate governance laws, their implementation and enforceability and level of
accounting standards’ quality would result in significant improvement in depend-
ence on equity financing by firms. Coffee (1999) argues that the discrepancies in
cases of corporate law may be less significant than the discrepancies regarding the
degree of regulation which characterises the strategies implemented by various
countries on their securities markets. Aggarwal et al. (2002) argued that countries
with inadequate legal environment and lower levels of corporate governance experi-
enced smaller levels of investment from fund managers. La Porta et al. (2000) inves-
tigated the relationship between economies in transition and the integral role
played by their legal institutions in the working of financial markets and found that
foreign investors are ready to put down funds into the markets and express their
will to provide the necessary managerial capabilities to new firms which are private
in nature provided that legal departments and the political system are enough to
limit the corruption among bureaucracy and eliminate the risk of properties being
confiscated by the government. Rosenberg and Birdzell (1987) wrote that the only
reason London arose as the world’s financial capital was due to the obvious fairness
in England’s legal system, that had been capitalised on at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. Csonto (2014) suggested that cross-country correlation of spreads
increases in high-volatility regimes but country-specific fundamentals are substanīial
determinants of spreads in each regime. Moreover, Spulbar and Birau (2019) argued
that international linkages based on causality and interdependence between emerg-
ing and developed stock markets reveal the effect of dynamic transmission models
focused on spreading financial shocks.
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Most of the economic and political science literature focuses on the effects of glo-
bal trade and finance on the policymaking of an individual country at the national
level (see for example, Armijo, 1999; Friedman, 1999; Helleiner, 1994; Obstfeld and
Taylor, 2004; Strange, 1996). Beck et al. (2003) examined why law and its origins
matter in financial development as far as political and adaptability aspects are con-
cerned. Moreover, income level plays a significant role in finance and growth rela-
tionship (Beck et al., 1999; Asongu, 2011b). Economies can only grow if good
governance is promoted in the aspects of enforcement of rule of law (R.L.), making
the public sector more accountable and efficient in taking care of corruption
(International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2005). La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) are of the
view that firms go for stock market financing more if significant improvements are
brought to corporate governance rules and their enforcement and quality of account-
ing standards. Fund manager for investments assigns extreme importance to legal
framework of a country and corporate governance standard (Aggarwal et al., 2002).
Various empirical studies shifted their focus from corporate governance level to coun-
try-specific governance environments (see for example, Agbor, 2011; Asongu, 2011b,
2011c, 2011d, 2011e, 2011f; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Shleifer and Wolfenson,
2002). North (1994) argued that stringent property right laws result in lower transac-
tion costs which leads to economic prosperity.
Stock market performance has its wider grip on the economy of the country.
Certain researchers such as Asongu (2012a, 2012b, 2012c) and Chen et al. (2009)
suggested that efficient distribution of capital is provided by developed stock mar-
kets as a result, while its cost of capital decreases. A well performing stock market
brings a positive vibe to the financial sector of the country and provides stability
(Umutlu et al., 2010). Financial stability shields the economy against risk spill overs
across the border (Beine et al., 2010). When a stock market is in a development
phase, it offers abnormal profits to investors and limit the scope of international
portfolio diversification because of the rise of arbitrage opportunities (von
Furstenberg et al., 1989). Castro et al. (2004) are of the view that two opposite fac-
tors form the bases of the relationship between economic development and investor
protection. Larger demands for capital and equitable risk sharing are the implica-
tions of significant improvement in investor protection and the demand factor cre-
ates a positive relationship between investor protection and economic development,
whereas, supply effect fosters the same phenomenon in opposite direction. Economies
with limited capital restrictions experience stronger demand effect than the supply
effect (La Porta et al., 1998). There is an ample amount of literature that examines the
relationship of stock market performance with governance indicators or investor pro-
tection. However, recent literature has not focused particularly on a specific group of
countries (developed or emerging stock markets) to examine their relationships with
stock market performance, specifically after the financially changing landscape of
economies. There is a need to re-examine the relationship of stock market performance
and investor protection of developed countries and how stock markets’ returns get
effected in this regard.
Narayan et al. (2015) find governance quality, proxied by government stability,
corruption, bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability and law and order, is a
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price risk factor for the countries that are not good at governance quality. The sample
of 38 countries ranked based on their risk measured by standard and Poor credit rat-
ing (AAA to BBB negative). There are 10 countries out of 38 with poor governance
quality where stock returns can be predicted by country-governance quality.
However, there is no evidence that country-governance quality can predict stock
returns in those countries that have relatively good standing on governance quality.
More recently, Boadi and Amegbe (2017) find V.A. and R.L. are positively significant
with stock market equity returns in the case of 23 countries from 1996 to 2014.
However, their study does not account for multicollinearity problem which is
common and major issue among World Governance Indicators. In the presence of
multicollinearity issue estimated coefficients are not efficient and reliable due higher
standard error.
There are three important and comprehensive studies that estimate the relationship
between governance quality (World Governance Indicators) and stock market per-
formance. The first study carried out by Hooper et al. (2009), who studied 50 coun-
tries (developed and developing), found a positive relationship between World
Governance Indicators and stock markets access returns (rit – rf). On the other hand,
Low et al. (2011) found World Governance Indicators have a negative impact on
stock market access returns in 48 countries. Low et al. (2014) ascertain a negative sig-
nificant impact of World Governance Indicators on emerging stock market returns,
but this effect is insignificant for developed countries. However, Ejaz et al. (2020)
argued that emerging stock markets provide more attractive portfolio diversification
opportunities compared to developed stock markets. These contradictory findings
require further investigation into the impact of governance quality on stock market
performance. This would also establish the channel through which governance quality
improves stock market performance, i.e., agency costs and transaction costs.
Moreover, not only above studies have contradictory findings but also old when
World Governance Indicator data was not available for substantial number of years
to extract meaningful results.
3. Data and methodology
The sample size consists of only 25 developed countries due to data limitation,1
namely Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the U.K. and the
U.S., for the period from 1997 to 2018. The annual stock market data and trading
volume are obtained from Datastream whereas World Governance Indicators, infla-
tion data are downloaded from the World Bank’s website. The oil prices are obtained
from the OECD website.
To examine the impact of country level governance quality on stock market
returns, we employ panel data regression analysis where the dependent variable is
stock market annual returns and independent variables are World Governance
Indicators including control variables namely oil prices, inflation and volume.
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3.1. Governance quality and stock market returns
Governance quality is designed to encapsulate the overall institutional environment of
a respective country rather than just focusing one particular dimension of quality.
We divide governance quality into three clusters as discussed below.
3.1.1. Cluster one: voice and accountability/political stability
Cluster one describes the way individuals who are responsible for managing the
government institutions are selected or replaced and their strength and ability to
effectively manage those institutions. The ability of government to govern over
financial system usually comes from the extent to which government are empow-
ered. V.A. measures political processes such as civil liberties and political rights.
This indicator also accounts for the freedom of media that play a vital role in mon-
itoring and holding authorities accountable for their actions. The P.S. indicates
that how wrenching changes in government compromises the quality of governance
and continuity of policies in a country. Lower V.A. and political instability lead
to lower investor confidence which further market volatility in downward and
vice versa.
3.1.2. Cluster two: government effectiveness/regulatory quality
The second set of clusters shed a light on the capacity of institutions to compre-
hensively develop and effectively enforce regulatory changes. Government
Effectiveness (G.E.) and R.Q. provide in-depth insight that how effectively govern-
ment can formulate and implement the policies. G.E. indicates the level of quality
in provision of public services, bureaucracy, provision and competency of civil
services without any political interferences and integrity of government’s commit-
ment to policies. R.Q. indicates market unfriendly policies like inadequate bank
supervision and price control. Moreover, R.Q. also explains unaligned and
unplanned excessive regulation on foreign trade and business development. The
authorities in government and R.Q. formulate certain policies that prevent any
activity in stock market which harm the interest of general public or investors.
Moreover, R.Q. enforces firms for full disclosure of information to prevent any
chance of insider trading.
3.1.3. Cluster three: rule of law/control of corruption
R.L. and C.C. are the most important indicators especially in the case of momentum.
These indicators provide a detailed overview of the relationship between the citizens
and institutions in a country. How much value institutions give to their countrymen
and how much institutions protect them from illegal and unethical practices going on
in a country. R.L. measures how effective, enforceable and predictable is the judicial
system in a country. Moreover, how well the law protects the contractual obligations
and property rights. This indicator can also be used as a proxy about how nations
achieve success and develop an environment which favours social interactions and
economic progress. In the financial development context, R.L. has a great importance,
as this indicator explains the perception and belief of investors and trust in the legal
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system of a country. C.C. summarises the level of corruption in state institutions and
magnitude of misuse of public power to obtain personal benefits.
The study also applies two world risk factors such as oil prices and inflation
along with trading volume as previous studies have established the relationship
between stock returns and trading volume. Previous literature finds a significant
relationship between these variables and stock market performance (Low et al.,
2011, 2014; Hooper et al., 2009; Hail & Leuz, 2006). The regression line involves
variables such as stock market annual returns (Returns), control over corruption
(Corruption Control), G.E. (Effectiveness), P.S. and avoidance of violence (Stability),
R.Q. (Regulatory), R.L. (Law), annual inflation (Inflation), annual trading volume
(Volume) and annual oil prices (Oil Prices). The measurement and source of these
variables are given in Table 1.
3.2. Research methodology
The study aims to measure the impact of governance quality (proxied by World
Governance Indicators) on stock market returns. To answer this question, current
study applies regression estimation technique to obtain sign and significance of betas.
In this vein, current study intends to regress following regression line.




Time series and cross-
section annual returns








World Governance Indicator Website.
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?Report_
Name=WGI-Table&Id = ceea4d8b
Effectiveness Time series and
Cross-sectional data
World Governance Indicator Website.
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?Report_
Name=WGI-Table&Id = ceea4d8b
Stability Time series and
Cross-sectional data
World Governance Indicator Website.
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?Report_
Name=WGI-Table&Id = ceea4d8b
Regulatory Time series and
Cross-sectional data
World Governance Indicator Website.
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?Report_
Name=WGI-Table&Id = ceea4d8b
Law Time series and
Cross-sectional data
World Governance Indicator Website.
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?Report_
Name=WGI-Table&Id = ceea4d8b
Voice Time series and
Cross-sectional data
World Governance Indicator Website.
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?Report_
Name=WGI-Table&Id = ceea4d8b
Inflation Time series and
Cross-sectional annual data
(Consumer Price Index)
World Bank Website / World Development Indicators
https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-
development-indicators
Volume Time series and Cross-section
annual data. (Number
of share traded for each
stock in one year)
DataStream




Note: Table 1 enlists measurement and sources of dependent variable ‘Returns’, independent variables ‘World
Governance Indicators’ and control variable ‘inflation, volume and oil prices’. All variables are in annual form.
Sources: Author’s own calculation.
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Regression Line
Returns ¼ /1 þ b1CorruptionCotrolj, t þ b2Effectivenssj, t þ b3Stabilityj, t
þ b4Regulatoryj, t þ b5Lawj, t þ b6Voicej, t þ b7Inflationj, t þ b8Volumej, t
þ b9OilPricesj, t þ xj, t
(1)
3.2.1. Model specification
World Governance Indicators are usually subject to higher multicollinearity problems
due to measuring inter linked dimensions of governance quality. In this regard,
Table 2 provides a correlation matrix among World Governance Indicators, V.A.
(Voice), G.E. (Effectiveness), P.S. and avoidance of violence (Stability), R.Q.
(Regulatory), R.L. (Law) and control over corruption (Corruption Control) and control
variable such as oil prices (Oil Prices), Trading volume (Volume) and inflation
(Inflation).According to the criteria if correlation coefficient is greater than or equal
to 0.9, it indicates the possible presence of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2009).
Corruption Control is highly associated with Effectiveness, Regulatory, Law and Voice.
Similarly, Effectiveness is highly correlated with Law.
Due to a higher correlation among variables, we carry out the variance inflation
factor (V.I.F.) to confirm the presence of multicollinearity. Table 3 shows the V.I.F.
for dependent and independent variables. Corruption Control, Law and Effectiveness
values are greater than 10, which indicate the presence of multicollinearity. The prob-
lem of multicollinearity violates one of the assumptions of classical regression (best
linear unbiased estimators). The estimators are not efficient (minimum variance) if
data is subject to the problem of multicollinearity (Guajarati, 2009).
The one suggested method to eliminate the problem of multicollinearity is to carry
out the principal component analysis (P.C.A.). The P.C.A. eliminates the common
variation among variables and make a composite variable that is representative of all
independent variables. Table 4 demonstrates the eigenvalues associated to each com-
ponent. The first component has 4.326 eigenvalue and explains 72% of variations in
the data. Cumulatively, all six components explain 100% of the variation. According
to the criteria, components with greater than 1.0 eigenvalue will be selected to consti-
tute composite index through the P.C.A. Table 4 shows only component 1 has an
eigenvalue greater than 1. The composite index based on the P.C.A. is given new
name WGI_Index which will be use in further analysis.
4. Empirical analysis
This section provides the model specifications tests such as: multicollinear, serial cor-
relation and heteroskedasticity to ensure that variables meet the classical linear regres-
sion assumption. As well as illustrating some descriptive statistics; the Hausman test,
regression analysis and robustness check.
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4.1. World governance indicators and equity returns
Table 5 provides a list of statistics for all 25 selected countries which includes: mean,
median, total risk, downside risk, skewness, kurtosis and value of probability for
Returns for the sample period from 1997 to 2018. It is observed that stock market
returns are highly volatile in sample countries with an average standard deviation of
27.63%. However, the downside risk 24.58% indicates that major proportion of total
risk arises from semi deviation (negative volatility) in stock returns. The similar pat-
tern can be observed for each individual country. Moreover, the probability value for
skewness and kurtosis shows that stock returns are mostly normally distributed
around the mean for individual country except for Australia, Chile, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Korea, Norway, Poland and Singapore, where the p-value is greater than
0.05. One plausible reason for non-normality in these countries may be a lower num-
ber of observations as there are 22 years of data for each country. The data usually
behave normally distributed when there are higher number of observations. This can
be verified when skewness and kurtosis are calculated for all countries including 550
observations. The p-value of skewness and kurtosis is less than 0.05 that imply our
dependent variable is normally distributed. The normality of our dependent variable
can also be confirmed through mean -14.78% and median -15.32 value for all coun-
tries. The smaller gap between mean and median also indicates that variable is nor-
mally distributed.
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics (panel form) for dependent variable Returns
and independent variables from 1997 to 2018. Table 6 also reveals the total number
Table 3. Variance inflation factor.
Variable VIF 1/VIF








Oil Prices 1.02 0.984188
Mean VIF 6.87
Note: Table 3 indicates the values for variance inflation factor. If VIF for each variable greater than 10, is a sign of
multicollinearity. Corruption Control, Law and Effectiveness are subject to the problem of multicollinearity.
Sources: Author’s own calculation.
Table 4. Eigenvalues for each component.
Component Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 4.326 0.721 0.72
Comp2 0.802 0.134 0.855
Comp3 0.581 0.097 0.952
Comp4 0.170 0.028 0.980
Comp5 0.069 0.012 0.991
Comp6 0.052 0.009 1.000
Note: Table 4 shows eigenvalues, explained proportion and cumulative explanation pertaining to each component.
For instance, Component 1 eigenvalue is 4.326 (greater than 1) and explain 72% of variation. Component 2 has
eigenvalue 0.802 (less than 1) and only explains 13% of the variation in data. As per the rule of thumb we compo-
nent that have eigenvalue greater than 1. In our case we select component 1 only as a composite variable of World
Governance Indicators.
Sources: Author’s own calculation.
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of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum value and maximum
value. The number of observations are 550 for all variables except Inflation, which
has 528 observations due to some missing values. The dependent variable Returns has
mean value -17.49% with standard deviation of 32.68%, which implies a greater vola-
tility in stock returns as can be verified through maximum and minimum values as
-84.15% and 20.75%, respectively. The World Governance Indicators have scores
from 0 to 100 where 0 ¼ poor, 100 ¼ best. The mean and median values of all the
World Governance Indicators are closer where they imply data is normally distrib-
uted around the mean. Similar intuition is also applies on Volume and Inflation.
Table 5. Country-wise stock returns (%) descriptive summary.
Country Average (%) Median (%) Total Risk Downside Risk Skewness Kurtosis Prob> chi2
Australia 46.25 48.04 29.83 26.25 0.603 0.127 0.232
Belgium 1.91 9.67 25.68 27.11 0.000 0.016 0.002
Canada 46.23 55.49 33.37 30.89 0.628 0.000 0.007
Chile 4.02 4.60 16.56 11.00 0.521 0.502 0.629
Denmark 3.88 3.59 24.97 22.84 0.003 0.010 0.002
Finland 2.69 3.00 23.72 23.31 0.002 0.010 0.002
France 5.46 0.60 19.53 21.22 0.000 0.000 0.000
Germany 26.02 18.05 29.89 27.59 0.089 0.722 0.182
Greece 33.31 31.35 33.35 27.34 0.752 0.291 0.515
Hong Kong 20.82 20.89 33.58 25.77 0.305 0.329 0.327
Israel 34.94 32.60 38.53 30.15 0.967 0.017 0.065
Italy 27.41 16.36 30.87 29.69 0.008 0.113 0.017
Japan 9.28 6.76 25.00 20.71 0.048 0.178 0.065
Korea 31.68 20.32 34.70 31.80 0.053 0.887 0.134
Netherland 8.82 1.17 27.95 26.97 0.008 0.109 0.017
New Zealand 7.31 2.98 18.24 17.85 0.005 0.030 0.007
Norway 13.01 8.59 31.35 24.52 0.137 0.712 0.270
Poland 15.10 18.23 33.50 21.78 0.497 0.086 0.153
Singapore 18.25 13.73 28.57 23.21 0.319 0.962 0.583
Spain 6.67 1.38 28.27 27.89 0.004 0.071 0.009
Sweden 8.00 1.70 28.42 25.84 0.021 0.253 0.047
Switzerland 1.10 6.24 21.50 21.28 0.008 0.198 0.023
Taiwan 5.99 2.01 26.96 26.95 0.004 0.049 0.007
United Kingdom 14.75 13.32 23.39 19.48 0.023 0.059 0.023
United States 76.57 84.15 23.13 23.13 0.000 0.000 0.000
All Countries 18.78 15.32 27.63 24.58 0.000 0.010 0.000
Note: Table 5 inculcates descriptive statistics of stock returns across 25 counties from 1997 to 2018 which include
average returns, median, standard deviation (total risk), downside risk, skewness, Kurtosis and p-value. Average
returns of all countries are normally distributed as indicated by p-value less than 0.05. Hence, our dependent
variable has normal distribution for regression analysis.
Sources: Author’s own calculation.
Table 6. Panel descriptive statistics.
Variables Obs Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Returns 550 17.49 8.14 32.68 84.15 20.75
Corruption Control 550 88.37 92.42 11.26 52.40 100
Effectiveness 550 89.72 92.34 8.96 60.19 100
Stability 550 74.02 77.34 20.06 7.10 100
Regulatory 550 89.50 92.19 8.61 59.13 100
Law 550 88.99 91.55 9.67 56.73 100
Voice 550 85.12 89.55 13.83 34.13 100
Volume 550 9.24 9.23 1.56 4.2 13.94
Inflation 550 1.70 1.67 1.42 4.15 7.87
Oil Prices 550 10.21 8.54 7.44 3.4 36.83
Note: Table 6 provide panel-wise descriptive statistics for dependent, independent and control variables. Table 6
includes number of observations, mean, median values, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values.
Sources: Author’s own calculation.
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To investigate the impact of World Governance Indicators on the dependent vari-
able, stock annual returns across our sample of 25 countries, Table 7 shows, based on
column one to six, an individual impact of each World Governance Indicator to iden-
tify the sign and significance of individual governance indicator whereas column
seven exhibits joint impact of World Governance Indicators on stock returns through
a variable WGI_Index generated by the P.C.A. Moreover, Table 7 also reveals R2,
number of countries and value of Hausman test to select the appropriate estimator
between fixed and random effect models. As per Table 7 the random effect estimator
is appropriate for column 3, Stability and column 4 Regulatory, however, for remain-
ing columns fixed effect estimator is applied.
Our finding indicates that impact of World Governance Indicators are profound
on world’s stock market returns. Table 7 exhibits Corruption Control, Effectiveness,
Stability, Regulatory, Law and Voice have positive significant impact of stock market
annual returns at 1% significance level. The composite variable WGI_Indexis also sig-
nificant with stock market returns at 1% level of significance. These finding
strengthen our viewpoint that better institutional quality increases the performance of
stock markets as predicted by La Porta et al. (1998) and Hooper et al. (2009).
Countries that have stronger investor protection laws, where shareholder’s rights
attached to securities are protected and enforceable by law, increase shareholder
Table 7. Panel Regression of Stock Market Returns on World Governance Indicators.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Returns Returns Returns Returns Returns Returns Returns
Constant 214.435 229.8 74.83 117.4 222.6 259.6 77.24















Inflation 9.930 9.045 8.946 9.094 9.274 9.333 9.874
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volume 8.164 8.210 5.701 5.316 8.679 8.467 8.287















R2 0.0704 0.0792 0.1323 0.0940 0.0643 0.0824 0.0637
Hausman Test 0.0123 0.0327 0.6932 0.1035 0.0366 0.0294 0.0002
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 550
Note: Table 7 presents coefficient of panel regression for 25 stock markets. Column 1 to column 6 we regress indi-
vidual variable of World Governance Indicators whereas column 7 ascertain the coefficient for WGI_Index composite
variable for World Governance Indicators. Table 7 inculcates positive interplay between governance quality and stock
returns. The value of Hausman test suggests whether estimator is fixed or random effect. We apply random effect
model where value of Hausman test is greater than 0.05. The level of significance of each coefficient is presented
by asterisks in parentheses, where p< 0.01, p< 0.05, p< 0.1.
Sources: Author’s own calculation.
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confidence and encourage them to surrender more funds to firm to finance their
business activities. From a larger perspective, better governance quality reduces trans-
action cost associated with firm operational activities, moreover, better governance
quality enhances investor protection through curtailing insider trading which uplifts
the investors’ confidence on overall financial system of the country. A reduction in
transaction costs would enlarge the profitable project opportunity set available to
firms, thus which in turn increases demand for equity. A better institutional enforce-
ment of corporate governance mechanism, in connection with reduced agency cost,
should increase the return to shareholders. Our findings support Hooper et al. (2009)
as they find positive significant relationship between institutional quality and stock
market performance, but contradict Low et al. (2014).
The control variables Inflation (Volume) are negatively (positively) significant with
stock returns across all regression columns that imply shareholders demand higher
premium when inflation increases and higher trading volume leads to higher stock
returns. Oil Prices are insignificant with stock returns throughout column 1 to 7
which is also supported by Hooper et al. (2009).
4.2. Robustness check
Further we apply robustness check to test whether positive significant relationship
between World Governance Indicators and stock market returns in Table 4.2 still
upholds for different econometric techniques. For this purpose, we aim to test how
World Governance Indicators response to only positive stock market annual returns.
To answer this question, we convert our dependent variable Returns into binary vari-
able that contains 1 for positive stock returns and 0 for otherwise. After introducing
binary dependent variable, the relationship no longer remains linear between depend-
ent and independent variables where ordinary least square regression cannot be
applied. To resolve this issue logit model is applied as follows.
PositiveReturns ¼ /1 þ b1CorruptionCotrolj, t þ b2Effectivenssj, t þ b3Stabilityj, t
þb4Regulatoryj, t þ b5Lawj, t þ b6Voicej, t þ b7Inflationj, t
þb8Volumej, t þ b9OilPricesj, t þ xj, t
Table 8 shows positive relationship between stock market returns and World
Governance Indicators still holds under logit regression when relationship is nonlin-
ear. Column 1 to 6 provides individual impact of World Governance Indicators
whereas column 7 estimates WGI_Index on Returns. Corruption Control,
Effectiveness, Law and Voice are positive and significantly affect Returns. Overall the
coefficient of each individual World Governance Indicators decreases in Table 8 as
compared to Table 7. The Stability and Regulatory has become insignificant, simi-
larly, coefficient of WGI_Index also decreases in Table 8. Moreover, Table 8 also
reveals the impact of control variables such as Inflation, Volume and Oil Prices.
Volume and Inflation remains positively and negatively, respectively, significant in
logit regression from column 1 to 7. Moreover, Oil Prices has become negatively
significant for all columns.
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5. Conclusion
The finding reveals that governance quality positively affects financial markets in
developed countries. The stock markets that operate under efficient governance and
institutional environments experience greater stock returns and lower level of risk.
This might lead to an argument that such risk and returns relationships cannot sus-
tain an equilibrium, as risk-averse investors will not invest in countries that are not
mean variance efficient. Nevertheless, this argument disregards international market
segmentation and the benefits of stock diversification that arise from countries with
poor governance. This is similar to the situation that risk-averse investors carry cer-
tain stocks with higher risk and lower returns to attain diversification benefits. As
conducive to Lombardo and Pagano’s (2006), superior risk-returns relationship exists
for countries that have higher institutional quality is also supported under inter-
national market segmentation and benefits of diversification.
Our results strengthen the viewpoint that better governance quality has a reducing
effect on agency and transaction costs which increase the stock returns for sharehold-
ers. This is a demand-centered viewpoint that suggests lower transaction costs are
associated with higher profitable projects for firms where firms in turn demand
higher equity financing. The growth in availability of profitable project enable firms
to increase the stock returns for shareholder through higher increase in the demand















VARIABLES Returns Returns Returns Returns Returns Returns Returns
Constant 3.040 2.944 1.794 2.060 2.705 4.050 1.00















inflation 0.422 0.413 0.404 0.421 0.416 0.431 0.417
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Oil Prices 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.0311 0.032
(0.059) (0.056) (0.061) (0.057) (0.058) (0.066) (0.058)
Volume 0.0156 0.150 0.163 0.140 0.150 0.1524 0.151
(0.057) (0.066) (0.049) (0.084) (0.066) (0.061) (0.065)
R2 0.0572 0.0527 0.0505 0.0489 0.0523 0.0607 0.0536
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 550
Note: Table 8 presents the coefficients estimated through logit mode. From column 1 to column 6 logit model
regresses an individual World Governance Indicators, whereas column 7 estimate composite WGI_Index variable on
binary dependent (returns). Our results in Table 8 confirms the results presented in Table 7 in terms of coefficient
signs and significance. P-value in parentheses.p< 0.01, p< 0.05, p< 0.1.
Sources: Author’s own calculation.
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for equity. Consequently, higher demand for equity financing in countries with better
institutional environments are often associated with higher equity returns. Based on
this evidence, we conclude that governance quality has prime importance in enhanc-
ing financial market performance.
We recommend, based on our findings, that neoclassical theories on transaction
economics and agency conflict should update their theoretical framework due to an
increasing interaction between governance quality and firm. Mostly this interaction
arises through transaction cost and agency costs. Additionally, the agency cost should
be considered as part of transaction costs. The contractual negotiation between eco-
nomic agents and cost of production in real world give rise to transaction and agency
costs. A comparative study between these two cost will increase our understanding
about how state level governance quality is linked with the operations of financial
markets. The importance of investigating such relationship rests upon economic
development, institutional and financial system that are conducive to capital accumu-
lation. Thus, the governance quality should be strengthen that set the direction of
change to achieve greater financial stability and growth.
Due to a data availability issue, our analysis is confined to 25 developed countries
and only includes three control variables. A higher number of countries will increase
the generalisation of the research and inclusion of more control variable may increase
the R2. Our findings cannot be extrapolated to developing (emerging) countries which
make it unsure whether positive relationship holds in case of developing countries or
not. A future comparative research study will be conducted in order to investigate
whether positive relationship and the governance quality degree of impact on stock
market performance still hold and if are similar for developed and developing coun-
tries. Moreover, the relationship between quality of governance and its impact on for-
eign direct investment is also an area of interest.
Note
1. The data was requested from University of Utara Malaysia. We have obtained data for
only 25 developed countries.
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